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I. INTRODUCTION
Microsoft Corporation's jousting with the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division over the last two years has been the subject of
widespread media interest. The Division has required Microsoft to
change its licensing practices; it has thwarted Microsoft's planned
merger with Intuit. Furthermore, the Division has threatened to
block Microsoft's introduction of its new Windows 95 operating sys-
tem as a result of a dispute over the lawfulness of Microsoft's incorpo-
ration into that program of an icon helping users to sign on to
Microsoft's new on-line service. The sparring between the Justice De-
partment and Microsoft over these Department challenges to
Microsoft's plans may reveal something about the antitrust laws and
about the Department's current views of what those laws are about.
In the three instances mentioned, the antitrust theories underly-
ing the Department's position merit close examination. In each case,
the theoretical base of the Department is either novel or raises issues
which have not yet been fully explored. During the 1960s, antitrust
caselaw developed without the benefit of an underlying theory.' As a
result, the law took a number of wrong turns. A major cause of the
confused state of the caselaw was the failure of the Department to
embrace a theoretically coherent approach to antitrust enforcement.
Rather, the Department at that time appears to have taken on the role
of an aggressive litigator, leaving to the courts the task of generating a




coherent caselaw framework. The generation of a coherent antitrust
caselaw, however, is a task for which the courts need the help of the
Justice Department, a Justice Department which has developed its
own overall antitrust approach and to which the courts can properly
defer.2 During the Reagan/Bush Administrations, the Justice Depart-
ment embraced the so-called "Chicago School" of antitrust analysis as
the theoretical basis for its actions.3 Today, the Department's theoret-
ical approach to antitrust is unclear. The Department has every right
to abandon, or to modify as it sees fit, the Chicago School approach,
so long as it has a coherent alternative. The Department has, how-
ever, an obligation to act consistently, as opposed to developing policy
ad hoc. Whether the Department has worked out a fully developed
and coherent framework for its enforcement actions is, therefore, a
matter of legitimate public concern. It is reasonably clear that the
present administration of the Department's Antitrust Division differs
with the policies of its predecessors in a number of ways. The public is
vitally interested in what these differences are, and whether these dif-
ferences are part of a coherent approach to antitrust enforcement.
In this paper, I use the Department's relations with Microsoft
Corporation to cast light on its present policy positions. The questions
which need to be addressed are: (1) whether the Department has
worked out the theoretical underpinnings of the approaches which it
is presently taking? (2) what in fact are the theories which the Depart-
ment has adopted? and (3) whether those theories withstand critical
examination? In the pages that follow, the ground-work for such an
examination is laid out.
In examining the Department's antitrust theories, I proceed in
the following way. Part I sketches out some factual background.
Next, I explore the licensing issue which arose in the consent decree to
which District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin originally objected,4 but
which was ultimately entered by direction of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.5 I then examine the
2. See id. at 1706, 1709 (contending that the courts need assistance on antitrust policy from
the enforcement authorities); cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (recognizing a critical role for the executive in the formulation of
policy).
3. Gifford, supra note 1, at 1706 & n.173.
4. Judge Sporkin objected to the scope of the consent decree, which he believed was too
narrow. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 338 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,928
(D.D.C. Mar. 14, 1995).
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
1995), on remand from United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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abortive Microsoft/Intuit merger. Finally, I explore the issues sur-
rounding the release of Windows 95.
II. MICROSOFT AS THE SUBJECT OF ANTITRUST CONCERN: SOME
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Certain facts about Microsoft are well-known. Personal com-
puters emerged into public consciousness in the late 1970s. Until the
early 1980s, operating systems for personal computers varied from
brand to brand. Apple, which emerged as a major player in the per-
sonal computer market, used a proprietary operating system.6 By
maintaining proprietary operating systems, companies like Apple
locked-in customers to their software.
This was the state of the personal computer market when IBM
entered in 1981. When IBM began selling personal computers in that
year, it made a decision to adopt a so-called "open architecture"
system.7
In designing its personal computer, IBM chose the microproces-
sor produced by the Intel Corporation, and selected Microsoft Corpo-
ration to provide it with an operating system.8 Microsoft purchased
an operating system from another company, Seattle Computer Prod-
ucts which had developed QDOS, a clone of Digital Research Corpo-
ration's CP/M 8-bit operating system. QDOS then became the basis
of MS-DOS, the 16-bit operating system employed in the IBM Per-
sonal Computer.9 IBM's decision to employ an open architecture sys-
tem encouraged independent software companies to supply software
for its personal computers. The rapid multiplication of software
helped to expand the market for IBM's personal computers. Accord-
ingly, IBM rapidly dominated the personal computer market.
IBM's dominance was short-lived, however, because many in-
dependent manufacturers began to produce "clones" of the IBM per-
sonal computer. The clone producers generally used the Intel
microprocessor in their machines and equipped them with MS-DOS
purchased from Microsoft. The clones were the functional equivalent
6. Don Crabb, A Mac Melange, BYTE, Mar. 1990, at 97.
7. The open architecture system permitted and encouraged independent vendors to pro-
duce applications software which could run on the operating system employed in the IBM per-
sonal computer. STEVEN MANES & PAUL ANDREW, GATES: How MICROSoT'rs MOGUL
REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY-AND MADE HIMSELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA 152 (1994).
8. Kenneth C. Baseman et al., Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing
and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System
Software, 40 ArITRusT BULL. 265, 271 (1995).
9. Id. See infra note 120.
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of the IBM personal computers and their competition rapidly eroded
IBM's market share."° Thus, although IBM lost its dominance of the
personal computer market, the input providers which it selected, Intel
and Microsoft, continued to dominate the markets for personal com-
puter microprocessors and personal computer operating systems. The
dominance of Intel and Microsoft has continued over the years as
each company has periodically replaced its product with improved
versions. Intel has successively replaced the 8088 microprocessor with
the 80286, the 80386, the 80486, and the current Pentium (the 80586).
Microsoft has produced six successively improved versions of MS-
DOS. It produced a graphic user interface called Windows in 1985
which operated over the underlying operating system. Recently,
Microsoft has started marketing Windows 95, an operating system
containing its own graphic user interface.
Microsoft's "Windows" venture was an attempt to do for the
IBM-compatible market what Apple had done with its Macintosh:
provide a graphic user interface enabling users to call up applications
programs by touching a visual symbol (or "icon") with a cursor con-
trolled by a "mouse," a pointing device which moves the cursor on the
screen with a small movement of the hand. Indeed, Microsoft has a
license from Apple, entitling it to use much of the visual display em-
bodied in the Macintosh graphics." The original Windows, however,
was an overlay on the underlying operating system. Users would in-
stall Windows on machines on which MS-DOS (or other compatible
operating system) was already installed. Windows evolved through
several versions. The new "Windows 95," however, is itself an operat-
ing system containing its own graphical user interface.
After cooperating for more than a decade, Microsoft and IBM
parted ways in the 1990s.11 Until 1992, the two companies had been
jointly developing OS/2 ("operating system 2"),'1 an operating system
conceived as a successor to DOS. Originally introduced in 1987, OS/2
evolved into a powerful 32-bit operating system in the years immedi-
ately following the split between the two companies. IBM's introduc-
tion of the 32-bit OS/2 2.0 in 1992 was followed by Microsoft's
introduction, in the following year, of Windows NT ("new technol-
ogy"), its own 32-bit operating system, also derived from the earlier
10. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 265.
11. Id. at 291-92. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)
(construing the license), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
12. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 432-38.
13. BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 62 (1995).
1996]
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OS/2.14 In 1994 IBM introduced OS/2 Warp, its most recent version
of OS/2 and also a full 32-bit system.
These several 32-bit systems break the constraining effect that
DOS had on applications performance.' 5 Until recently, demand for
the 32-bit systems has been sluggish among nonbusiness users. Win-
dows NT effectively requires 16 megabytes of RAM (Random Access
Memory),'16 a requirement that alone discouraged widespread adop-
tion among such users. Moreover, Windows NT apparently would not
run the (16-bit) Windows applications software as well as Windows
3.1.1 The power of both Windows NT and OS/2 Warp has not been a
major attraction to nonbusiness users who, until now, generally have
not seen a need for the multitasking capability of the 32-bit systems
and for whom Windows 3.1 has performed satisfactorily.
Yet personal computers have been increasing in power over the
years, while their performance has been limited by the 16-bit DOS/
Windows operating system. The general understanding in the indus-
try, accordingly, is that ultimately all operating systems will employ a
32-bit platform. Like Windows NT and OS/2 Warp, Windows 95 is
designed to run on a 32-bit platform, but carries 16-bit capability as
well. Windows 95, however, is more of a hybrid than the other two
systems, being designed especially as a transition device.' 8 Although
Microsoft claims that Windows 95 can operate on 4 megabytes of
RAM, the system operates better with 8 megabytes' 9 and some ob-
servers believe that 16 megabytes becomes preferable as users attempt
to enjoy Windows 95's multitasking capabilities. 21 Off-the-shelf hard-
ware carrying 8 and 16 megabytes of RAM is now routinely carried in
most retail computer stores, so these RAM requirements are no bar-
rier to adoption. Windows 95 generally will run DOS applications and
this capability together with the current compatibility of its RAM re-
quirements with the new hardware makes it a transitional operating
system. As a result, Windows 95 provides a bridge from the 16-bit
platform of MS-DOS and a separate Windows graphic user interface
14. Harry McCracken & Tinoo Singh, Windows 95 versus Windows NT versus Warp versus
Mac, PC WORLD. Feb. 1996, at 145, 146.
15. MS-DOS and other DOS systems were based upon a "16-bit" platform. This 16-bit
platform was originally adapted to the available hardware, but as the hardware increased in
power, that power could not be fully exploited on a 16-bit platform.
16. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 461. According to Manes & Andrews, Windows
NT is said to require a minimum of 12 megabytes of RAM but actually needs 16 megabytes.
17. Jon Udell, Is There a Better Windows 3.1 Than Windows 3.1?, BYT=, Nov. 1993, at 85.
18. Tom R. Halfhill, Inside the Mind of Microsoft, BYTE, Aug. 1995, at 48, 49.
19. Tadesse W. Giorgis, Big Decision: Warp vs. Windows, BYTE, Apr. 1966, at 154, 155.
20. Stanford Diehl, Windows 95: The Numbers, BYTE, Oct. 1995, at 113.
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to the more powerful Windows NT or a successor designed as a full
32-bit platform and incorporating its own graphic user interface.
Against the background of industry developments, Microsoft can
be seen to be engaged in a fierce competition with IBM for the oper-
ating systems market for IBM-compatible personal computers. With
its OS/2 2.0 and 2.1, IBM arrived first with an operating system for a
32-bit platform, a move countered by Microsoft with Windows NT.
Microsoft first induced computer users to adopt Windows as an add-
on to MS-DOS. After exploiting Windows' popularity, Microsoft is
now attempting to use Windows 95 as a transitional device to en-
courage its existing Windows customer base to make its way through
Windows 95 to Microsoft's powerful 32-bit operating system, Win-
dows NT or its successor. Thus, Microsoft is exploiting its product
development with imaginative and aggressive marketing to get an
edge on IBM.
IBM (through its joint venture with Apple and Motorola) has de-
veloped a reduced instruction set computer (RISC) processor for use
in desktop and notebook computers.2' Apple, a member of that ven-
ture, has been marketing its "power Macintosh," based upon that
RISC microprocessor for over a year.22 IBM had been widely ex-
pected to employ that microprocessor in a new RISC-powered per-
sonal computer, thus extending a new challenge to Microsoft's
position in the operating systems market - while simultaneously
challenging the Intel Corporation in the microprocessor market. As
of February 1996, however, IBM had decided that its new
microprocessor is better suited to work stations than to desktop per-
sonal computers.23
This brief description of events in the personal computer operat-
ing systems industry depicts an industry in which large firms are in
intense competition in developing and selling operating systems. At
present, the leading players in the personal computer operating sys-
tems market are Microsoft, Apple, and IBM, with Microsoft and IBM
contending in the IBM-compatible sector of that marketplace.
Microsoft has so far held the lead through creative product develop-
ment combined with imaginative and aggressive marketing. In the
21. Steve Lohr, At Last, a Sneak Preview of Big Blue's Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994,
at D1.
22. Peter H. Lewis, The New Power Macs Seen as a Triple Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1994, at C13.
23. Quentin Hardy, Motorola-Apple Licensing Pact Aims to Enhance Image and PowerPC
Chip, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1996, at B7.
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pages below, I argue that, for the most part, IBM does not need the
help of the antitrust laws to compete with Microsoft.
III. THE ANTITRUST LAW BACKGROUND: ACADEMIC AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
From at least the late 1950s through the mid 1970s, the Justice
Department, with the support of the Supreme Court, was pursuing an
expansionary approach to the scope of antitrust prohibitions. 24 Dur-
ing this period, the antitrust laws were judicially construed to ban a
wide variety of behavior which had not previously been considered
either anticompetitive or unlawful.25 Although most of the caselaw
developments of this period were the result of Government instituted
litigation, private actions also engendered expansionary decisions.26
The sad aspect of this development is that it rested upon no underly-
ing theory. The case rationales were inconsistent and confused. The
bar was necessarily handicapped in advising its business clientele. The
national welfare was neglected in the administration of a set of laws
designed to advance that welfare.
Ultimately this expansionary caselaw produced its own reaction.
This caselaw encouraged scholarly critiques in the law schools and ec-
onomics departments of the nation's universities. Led in significant
part by academics identifying with the University of Chicago, the late
1960s and 1970s produced the so-called "Chicago School" of antitrust
analysis.27 Under a Chicago School approach, case analysis must em-
ploy consistent sets of rules or evaluative techniques justified by eco-
nomic theory. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court reversed the course
that it had been following throughout the 1960s and adopted a Chi-
cago-School approach to antitrust analysis.28 The Court first signaled
its new attitude in 1974 in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.9
In that same year, the Court confirmed its new approach in two bank
merger decisions: United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.30 and
24. See Gifford, supra note 1, at 1706 (discussing the developments of such an approach).
25. Id. at 1681-82.
26. Id. at 1682. Among the Supreme Court's expansionary decisions rendered in private
litigation were: Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959).
27. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
933 (1979). See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
28. See supra note 27.
29. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
30. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
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United States v. Connecticut National Bank.3 Its 1977 decision in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 32 further evidenced its
new appreciation of microeconomic analysis. Its course of decisions
during the 1980s demonstrated the Court's continuing commitment to
a Chicago School antitrust approach. During the 1981-92 period, the
Justice Department was part of a conservatively-oriented Administra-
tion which accepted Chicago School analysis as consonant with its
own ideological outlook.
During the 1980s a number of antitrust scholars began looking for
a successor approach to that of the Chicago School.33 Steven Salop
developed an analysis centered on the concept of "raising rivals'
costs."34 Others have focused upon strategic behavior and game the-
ory as sources for new antitrust doctrines .3  The advent of a "post-
Chicago antitrust analysis" has been announced repeatedly.36 Yet so
far the Chicago School represents the consensus. Although the
Supreme Court appeared to deviate from that approach in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. ,37 its subsequent decisions
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.38 and
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan39 are suggestive of its continuing
reliance upon microeconomic analysis as the basis for antitrust
prohibitions.
The orientation of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
during the Clinton Administration is unclear. Anne Bingaman, who
has headed the Division since 1993, has stated that she is in agreement
with the basic approaches of her predecessors during the Reagan/
31. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
32. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 213
(1985).
34. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Competition and Cooperation in the
Market for Exclusionary Rights, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 109 (1986); Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price,
96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 267 (1983). Salop and others have continued this line of inquiry up to the present
time. See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995). For a critical review of this approach, see Timothy J.
Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs", 33 ANTITuST BULL. 95, 107 (1988).
35. Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35-36
(1994); William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transforma-
tion of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1465 (1990).
36. See Hovenkamp, supra note 33, at 225.
37. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
38. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
39. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
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Bush period.4" Yet some significant differences are manifested in her
actions. One of her first acts was to revoke the vertical restraints
guidelines," apparently because she believed them to be too permis-
sive. But her concern about vertical relationships seems to be deep
seated. She is also responsible for the Department's renewed interest
in vertical mergers and acquisitions. In 1994, the Department chal-
lenged three major telecommunications acquisitions: (1) the AT&T/
McCaw acquisition;42 (2) British Telecommunications' investment in
MCI;43 and (3) the reintegration of Liberty Media Corporation with
Telecommunications, Inc. (TCI).44 In these cases, the Department's
concern appears to have been focused primarily upon two factors.
First, the Department was concerned with incentives engendered by
vertical integration for the combination to exploit power that it may
possess over unintegrated rivals who compete with one part of the
combination's operations and purchase or sell to another part of its
operations. Second, the Department was concerned about the possi-
bility that the combination might unfairly exploit information to which
it had access.45 The Department's new emphasis on vertical relation-
ships was also reflected in its apparent concern that Microsoft may be
using its dominant position in the personal computer operating sys-
tems market to assist its entry into the provision of on-line services,
thus leveraging power in an upstream market into a competitive ad-
vantage in a downstream market. For some time, this concern
threatened to delay the introduction of Windows 95.46
40. Republican Victories Won't Affect Antitrust Division's Competition Policy, 67 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1691, at 631 (1994).
"There has to be a core of reasonable, sound, middle-of-the-road endforcement"
that stays constant through Administrations and the waxing and waning of party influ-
ences, Bingaman pointed out. "We can argue at the fringes, .... but business must have
confidence that the people in this job are not doing a political job in any way, shape, or
form," she added. "That's why we don't plan to change what we're doing."
Id.
41. Division to Recall Verticals Guides, Expand Amnesty Policy for Corporations, 65 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1627, at 227 (Aug. 12, 1993).
42. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158 (1994).
43. United States v. MCI Communications Corp. 59 Fed. Reg. 33,009 (1994).
44. United States v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723 (1994).
45. James A. Keyte, Foreclosure and Harm to Competition: Some Lessons for Defending
Vertical Mergers, ANTrrRUST, Spring 1995, at 42.
46. The Government was concerned that the Windows 95 release would include an icon
facilitating subscription to Microsoft's on-line service. The Government apparently viewed the
inclusion of the icon as a means through which Microsoft was "leveraging" the popularity of its
Windows 95 program to provide itself an advantage in competing with Prodigy, CompuServ, and
America Online, firms already established in the provision of on-line services. The Government
expressed its concern that " 'every user who purchases Win 95 to upgrade an existing computer,
as well as the millions who buy computers for the home with Win 95 already installed, will, it
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This sensitivity of the Department to the potential of vertical re-
lationships for producing anticompetitive results was not present dur-
ing the Bush and Reagan Administrations, so the Department's
activism suggests that Ms. Bingaman may have opted for some version
of post-Chicago antitrust analysis.47 On the other hand, the relief
which the Department has obtained in the three telecommunications
cases is minimal.48  The Department's actions are vulnerable to the
criticism that its actions are political. For example, it brings actions
against large companies for the publicity value, but is careful not to
interfere with their operations.49 Conversely, the Department's ac-
tions may be explained as a cautious commitment to a post-Chicago
approach. The Department believes that some vertical acquisitions
carry the potential for anticompetitive consequences, but recognizes
that many vertical relationships carry a strong efficiency potential.
These beliefs would be consistent with the actions of the Department
in increasing its enforcement in the vertical area while remaining cau-
tious about the relief which it seeks.
IV. THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS
Recently, the Justice Department has focused sustained attention
upon Microsoft Corporation. After investigating Microsoft for possi-
ble antitrust offenses, the Federal Trade Commission split 2-2 on pro-
ceeding against Microsoft on a variety of alleged offenses." The
appears, automatically receive the MSN access software.'" See Government, Microsoft Contest
Merits and Timing of Latest CID, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1722, at 52 (July
20, 1995).
47. Some commentators believe that the era of post-Chicago antitrust analysis has begun.
See Riordan & Salop, supra note 34; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Econo-
mists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63
ANTrrRuST L.J. 669 (1995).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723 (1994)
(prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination against unaffiliated video programming providers "where
the effect of such discrimination is unreasonably to restrain competition"). Those terms appear
to make the decree less predictable in application than analogous provisions in the Clayton Act.
49. Murray Edelman describes such behavior in his classic book on the subject. MURRAY
EDELMAN, THm SYMBOLIC USES OF PoLrncs 40 (1964). Edelman argues that political figures
often act symbolically, accomplishing nothing of substance but profiting from the appearance of
action.
50. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 321 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (reporting that the FTC apparently considered charges involving the practice of
"vaporware," i.e., announcing a product's future availability although the product may have
been unavailable, favoring its own applications developers over competing developers with ini-
tial access to information about its new operating systems, tying, and exclusive supply aspects of
its licensing practices).
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Justice Department then took over the Commission's investigation."
A major part of the Department's case against Microsoft consisted of
claims that certain aggressive marketing practices by Microsoft im-
peded the ability of rival suppliers of personal computer operating
systems (such as IBM which markets the rival OS/2 Warp) to market
their own products.5 2
A. The Exclusionary Provisions
Among the licensing practices which the Department successfully
challenged were certain agreements between Microsoft and computer
manufacturers which were equivalent to exclusive supply contracts. 3
In many of its licenses, Microsoft obtained commitments from com-
puter manufacturers to purchase licenses for their estimated produc-
tion capacity. Microsoft then negotiated a royalty charge equal to the
licensee's estimated production multiplied by an agreed-upon fee per
unit of that production.54 That charge would then take the form of a
lump sum payable in several installments over a year.55 The arrange-
ment was generally referred to as a "per processor" license, because it
was measured by the number of microprocessors which the licensee
shipped. (Each personal computer is equipped with a microproces-
sor). The Department objected to this arrangement because it effec-
tively excluded rival producers of operating systems from dealing with
personal computer manufacturers who were Microsoft customers, a
class which includes most such manufacturers.5 6
The consent decree prohibited Microsoft from charging royalties
to computer manufacturers based upon the number of processors
shipped.17 Because this practice imposed a royalty charge upon com-
puter manufacturers for machines equipped with non-Microsoft oper-
ating systems, those manufacturers had to pay twice for non-Microsoft
operating systems: once to the licensor of the non-Microsoft system
and once again to Microsoft. In addition to prohibiting the per-
processor royalty, the consent decree also prohibited Microsoft from
51. Id. at 321-22.
52. Id. at 323.
53. Id.
54. See Baseman et al., supra note 8, at 274.
55. Id. at 274 n.14.
56. Complaint if 19-28, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,096 (D.D.C. Aug. 21 1995) (Civ. A. 94-156420).
57. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,096, at 75,244 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 1995) (Final Judgment I IV(C)).
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obtaining commitments to specified numbers of licensed units,58 and it
prohibited a lump-sum method of payment.5 9 The effect of these pro-
visions is to force Microsoft to abandon the practice of issuing manu-
facturer licenses for the estimated production capacity of the licensee
at a lump sum figure. The objectionable feature in these licenses lay
in the effect of reducing the computer manufacturer's marginal cost
for operating systems licenses to zero up to the minimum require-
ment.6° Even in the absence of a commitment by the customer for a
specified number of copies, at a marginal cost of zero for a Microsoft
copy, no other supplier of operating systems could compete for sales
to that manufacturer. Critics of this type of licensing characterize it as
an "exclusionary" device, preventing rival suppliers of operating sys-
tems from competing.61 It was, of course, a particular form of an ex-
clusive supply (or "requirements") contract. Like many exclusive
supply contracts, it was both an aggressive sales device and a means
for achieving significant efficiencies.
B. Monitoring Efficiencies
Microsoft defended this lump-sum licensing practice precisely as
an efficient means for combating manufacturer fraud. Since licenses
authorize manufacturers to electronically reproduce the operating sys-
tem on the hard drive of each machine, and since the reproduction of
a software program is essentially costless, manufacturers paying a per-
unit licensing fee would have an incentive to underreport the number
of operating systems installed on machines of their manufacture. The
lump-sum license fee eliminates the incentive of manufacturers to
cheat and eliminates the need to monitor the brands which have en-
tered into lump-sum manufacturer licenses.
Lump-sum licensing fees (or "blanket licenses") were before the
Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.," a case involving collective licensing by the copyright holders of
sheet music. The copyright holders collectively employed two com-
mon agencies (ASCAP and BMI) to negotiate blanket licenses to ra-
dio and television networks for all of their works.63 In that case the
58. Id. at 75,244 (Final Judgment I IV(F)). The decree, however, permits Microsoft and
computer manufacturers to develop "non-binding estimates of projected sales of Microsoft's...
products for use in calculating royalty payments." Id.
59. Id. at 75,245 (Final Judgment I IV(H)).
60. See Baseman et al., supra note 8, at 274.
61. See id. at 296-98.
62. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
63. Id. at 4-6.
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Court ruled that the efficiencies connected with the blanket license
were sufficient to take the arrangement out of the scope of the per se
rule against horizontal price fixing.64 Under the rule of reason, the
question would be whether the cost savings achieved by the blanket
license issued by the collective licensing agencies would so reduce cost
that output would be increased over alternative arrangements. In
Broadcast Music, Inc., the lump-sum license eliminated the incentives
of networks to cheat and dispensed with the need for monitoring,
characteristics which seem to inhere in the Microsoft lump-sum li-
cense as well.
C. The Evolution of the Law Governing Exclusive Supply
Contracts
The "exclusionary" effects of the lump-sum manufacturer license
are equivalent to those which would be produced by any exclusive
supply contract. Indeed, as noted above, the lump-sum license creates
an exclusive supply contract. The leading Supreme Court decisions on
the lawfulness of exclusive supply contracts date from the late 1940s to
the 1960s. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States65 and Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,66 the Court held that exclusive supply con-
tracts are unlawful when they cover a "substantial share" of the prod-
uct in the market.67 In the mid 1960s, the Court, in FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., Inc.,68 asserted that a large manufacturer's program of re-
quiring its dealers to enter into exclusive supply contracts "obviously
conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and
§ 3 of the Clayton Act."' 69 Yet this caselaw has probably been im-
pliedly modified by Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., ° the
leading case on nonprice vertical restraints. Under the approach of
GTE Sylvania, vertical restraints are subjected to a rule-of-reason
evaluation and are generally upheld unless competition in the general
(or interbrand) market is shown to have been reduced.7' Such a re-
duction in interbrand competition could be shown by proof that mar-
ket supply in the relevant product had been reduced below the level
which would be forthcoming in a competitive market.
64. Id. at 24.
65. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
66. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
67. Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 314; Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 325, 328-29, 333.
68. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
69. Id. at 321.
70. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
71. Id. at 58-59.
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Underlying the traditional approach of Standard Oil, Tampa Elec-
tric, and Brown Shoe is a concern that when existing input suppliers
control in the aggregate a large share of the available outlets, entry
into the input supply industry will be impeded. Entry then may have
to take the form of two-level entry into the input supply and output
industries simultaneously, thus increasing the costs of entry. Yet this
analysis is composed of several layers. First, it requires attention not
only to the share of the exclusive supply contracts of any one supplier,
but to the aggregate share of exclusive supply contracts by all manu-
facturers. Second, when many or most suppliers sell through exclusive
supply contracts, this may indicate that the practice of selling through
exclusive supply contracts is driven by efficiency concerns. At that
point, it is proper to accept the practice as consistent with the effi-
ciency goals of antitrust law and to redefine the product market as the
market for exclusive supply contracts. In those situations, exclusive-
supply contracts no longer constitute a cognizable restraint. They are
instead efficiency-justified. The Court acknowledged as much in
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,2 albeit in dicta.73
The concern that widespread use of exclusive supply contracts by
producers would raise the costs of entry into the producer market was
incorporated into the Justice Department's vertical restraints guide-
lines in the mid 1980s. 74 The guidelines, however, also incorporated
another factor widely recognized under the earlier Standard Oill
Tampa Electric approach: the difficulty of entry into the customer
market.75 The Supreme Court recognized this factor in Standard Oil
when it referred to the limited number of strategically located retailer
outlets subject to Standard's requirements contracts.76 If entry into
the customer market is easy, then an existing base of exclusive supply
contracts portends less foreclosure to entrants at the supplier level
than if entry to the customer level is difficult. Under the guidelines,
no exclusionary objection to exclusive-supply contracts would be up-
held if entry at the customer level was easy.77 If entry at the customer
72. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
73. Id. at 499-500.
74. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS § 3.22 (1985) (revoked
1993) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS], reprinted in 16 ANTITRUST LAWS &
TRADE REGULATION Vol. 1, app. 5 (Von Kalinowski, ed. 1995).
75. Id.
76. Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 304 n.6.
77. GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 74, § 3.22. See also id., § 4.2 ("The
finding of easy entry in just one market will cause the Department to conclude that the vertical
restraint is lawful if: (1) it is clear that exclusion is the only possible anticompetitive effect of the
restraint, and entry is very easy in the foreclosed market .... ).
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level was difficult, however, then widespread use of exclusive-supply
contracts, which would force an entrant at the supplier level to enter
at both the supplier and customer levels, would constitute a substan-
tial restraint78 which would be condemned, absent an efficiency justifi-
cation. The vertical restraints guidelines, however, indicated that
impediments to entry engendered by large-scale use of exclusive sup-
ply contracts would be balanced against their efficiency-enhancing ef-
fects.79 The guidelines, of course, are no longer in force. Moreover,
even when they were in force, they did not apply to intellectual prop-
erty licensing.8" The guidelines provide a useful background of analy-
sis, however, because they represent the broad analytical framework
employed by the Department in the recent past to assess the signifi-
cance of vertical restraints.81
D. Questions About the Consent Decree
Several questions arise in connection with the consent decree.
First, how does the Department view the relation between the appar-
ent ease of entry into the computer manufacturing business and the
widespread use by Microsoft of lump-sum licenses? Why doesn't the
apparent easy entry into personal computer manufacturing ensure the
availability of outlets for OS/2 Warp? Even if entry into computer
manufacturing is easy, maybe every manufacturer - established or
new - would want a license for Microsoft operating systems. Indeed,
even IBM, the provider of the rival OS/2 Warp operating system,
probably needs Microsoft licenses. If this is in fact the case, then ease
of entry loses its significance. In such circumstances, rival operating
system providers would be effectively compelled to enter at both
levels in order to market their product. Every manufacturer - even
those who want to sell some machines installed with OS/2 Warp -
78. GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 74, §§ 3.22, 4.2.
79. See id., §§ 2.0, 4.226.
80. Id., § 2.4.
81. That similar analytical framework which applies to exclusive arrangements involving
intellectual property as well as other exclusive arrangements is recognized in the new Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FTC,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.1.2 (1995)[here-
inafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], reprinted in
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132, at 20742 ("The antitrust principles that apply to a licensor's
grant of various forms of exclusivity to and among its licensees are similar to those that apply to
comparable vertical restraints outside the licensing context, such as exclusive territories and ex-
clusive dealing."). These Guidelines, however, note that because of the greater vulnerability of
intellectual property to misappropriation, greater restrictions are tolerable in intellectual prop-
erty contexts than in other contexts. Id.
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needs, say Windows 95, to satisfy the bulk of its customers. Thus,
were Windows 95 to be available only through lump-sum licenses,
IBM would effectively be impeded in marketing its OS/2 Warp be-
cause it would be unable to find computer manufacturers who would
be free to purchase OS/2 Warp and would be willing to pay for it. This
seems to be the way the Justice Department looks at the factor of
ease-of-entry at the customer (computer-manufacturer) level.82
Even so, there is a theoretical problem lurking in the background:
If there is a market for computers equipped solely with OS/2 Warp as
the discussion above assumes, then why are there not computer manu-
facturers who specialize in meeting those demands? The existence of
such specialist computer manufacturers would eliminate the market-
foreclosure problem facing IBM. These specialist computer manufac-
turers would provide the outlets which IBM needs. This takes us back
to the factor of ease-of-entry at the customer (computer-manufac-
turer) level. If it is easy to enter computer manufacturing and if spe-
cialization in marketing OS/2 Warp machines is feasible, then the
exclusionary effect of Microsoft's lump-sum licenses may be minimal.
Indeed, IBM (the provider of OS/2 Warp) is itself a computer manu-
facturer. If the demand for OS/2 Warp-equipped machines does not
exceed IBM's personal computer production capacity, then IBM itself
can be the specialized vendor of OS/2 Warp-equipped personal com-
puters. On this analysis, the restraint constituted by Microsoft's lump-
sum licensing withers into insignificance.
Let us assume that specialization by vendors in OS/2 Warp ma-
chines is infeasible or inefficient. There still remains the question of
whether the inherent efficiency of Microsoft's lump-sum licenses is
sufficiently great to overcome their exclusionary effects. In addressing
this question, we should note an aspect of the lump-sum license that
differs from more conventional exclusive-supply contracts. As noted
above,83 the lump-sum license provides the customer computer manu-
facturers with a marginal-license-cost of zero for each machine pro-
duced. Indeed, it is this zero marginal-license-cost effect which
produces the exclusion. From the licensee's perspective, however,
there is another effect: In the short-run, the lump-sum licensee does
not take the licensing cost into account when it responds to changes in
market conditions. It has an incentive to reduce its price to meet ri-
vals' prices or otherwise to sell more machines without the con-
straining effect that a per-unit license charge would impose on its
82. See GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL REsTRAINTs, supra note 74, § 4.2.
83. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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decisionmaking. Thus for the short-run, the lump-sum license is more
output-enhancing than would be the per-unit charge which is normally
imposed in sales of commodities. Apart from any savings to Microsoft
in monitoring, the lump-sum license lowers the marginal costs of com-
puter manufacturers, freeing them to be more responsive to the de-
mands of the computer market. Thus, in addition to the efficiency
effects of the lump-sum license, the lump-sum license enhances short-
run competition in the computer-manufacturing market.'
E. The Factors of Declining Average Cost and Network
Externalities
The Justice Department's objections to the exclusive-supply con-
tracts, however, lay in their longer term effects. The Department be-
lieves that these supply contracts help to exclude Microsoft's rivals -
principally IBM - from outlets for their operating systems and thus
help Microsoft to acquire a monopoly in the long term. More pre-
cisely, the Department believes that Microsoft already possesses a
market share legally equivalent to a monopoly, and that these con-
tracts will further strengthen that monopoly.85 Then, after Microsoft
has effectively eliminated IBM as a competitor in operating systems,
the scenario proceeds, Microsoft will exploit that monopoly by re-
stricting output and raising prices. This long term scenario, however,
is subject to criticism on at least two grounds.
First, this scenario does not deal with a natural monopoly analy-
sis. In theory, operating systems could be a natural monopoly. If they
were a natural monopoly, then the exclusionary aspects of lump-sum
licensing would be matters of little concern, since a single company
would eventually control the market anyway. If Microsoft is to be the
prevailing "natural monopolist," then maybe its present large market
position is socially beneficial rather than the opposite. Thus, there is
ground to believe that society will be better off if the selection of the
natural monopolist occurs sooner rather than later, since an earlier
selection would minimize the amount of society's assets which are ex-
84. In Baseman et al., supra note 8, at 282, the authors suggest that a lump-sum license
would be inefficient because it would force licensees to operate at an inefficiently large scale.
This criticism of the lump-sum license does not appear to apply to the short run, where the lump
sum is a sunk cost after it is incurred. Moreover, the criticism would seem to apply even in the
long run only if Microsoft set a fixed sum applicable to all licensees, maintaining it through the
long-run period. If Microsoft negotiated the amount of the fee with each licensee, then the
criticism would not appear to apply at all.
85. Complaint 1 15-28 & Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 71,096 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995) (Civ. A. 94-156420).
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pended in providing the service.86 Under some circumstances, so-
called "network externality" effects may reinforce the natural monop-
oly effects, as described below. 87
Second, the scenario does not deal with the dynamic nature of
technology. Operating systems are continually in process. At the
stage of each new move to a higher-level technology, the market car-
ries a potential for opening wider to new entrants and for presenting
new opportunities to existing players. If Microsoft has been the
leader during the era of the 16-bit platform, perhaps IBM will be the
leader during the era of the 32-bit platform. We have no idea who will
lead in the era of the 64-bit platform.
1. The Natural Monopoly Analysis
The development of operating systems, like the development of
all computer programs, is an activity in which most of the costs are
incurred in research and development.88 After the program is devel-
oped, output costs are essentially zero. MS-DOS, Windows, Windows
NT, and Windows 95 are systems which are reproduced electronically
at minimal cost. After the program is developed and released,
Microsoft's costs are primarily marketing costs: the costs of negotiat-
ing licensing agreements with computer manufacturers. It also, of
course, incurs the costs of improving the program and of providing
technical support to users. To the extent that monitoring is necessary,
monitoring constitutes an additional cost. The costs of continuing
program development are fixed costs. Technical support costs in-
crease with output and, in a broad sense, may be considered variable.
So are monitoring costs. Thus, Microsoft incurs minimal marginal
costs. The cost structure of competitors, such as IBM (whose OS/2
Warp is a substitute for the MS-DOS/Windows combination, for Win-
dows 95, and for Windows NT), is similar. Thus producers of operat-
ing systems incur large, up-front research and development costs, and
minimal marginal CoStS.8 9 The average cost is determined by dividing
the research and development costs by the number of programs sold.
Consequently, this industry is one in which each firm faces a continu-
ally declining average cost curve. It is, in short, a textbook case of a
86. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir.
1982) (Posner, J.).
87. See infra part IV.E.2.
88. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat, 40
ANTrrRuST BULL. 257, 259 (1995).
89. Id.
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natural monopoly marketplace. Each firm reduces its average cost the
further it expands its volume. Each sale not only enhances the seller's
position by helping to reduce its average cost, but each sale also has
an impact on the seller's rivals. Each sale is one which the rivals did
not make and thus did not reduce the rivals' average costs.'
If the operating system market were a natural monopoly, unit
production costs would be minimized when one firm succeeded to that
monopoly. Society's resources would then be most efficiently allo-
cated. Moreover, because of the fall in unit costs, prices to consumers
might very well be lower than in a less efficient industry structure
composed of competing higher-cost producers.
2. Network Externalities
Operating systems are not only subject to scale economies, but
they also increase in value as they are used by more computer users.
This effect is sometimes referred to as a network externality.9' As
Windows has been adopted by a large number of users, producers of
applications programs have an incentive to devote their initial efforts
towards Windows-compatible programs. As various versions of Win-
dows (Windows 3.1, Windows NT, Windows 95) represent significant
market shares, applications makers find less time and incentive to de-
velop programs for non-Windows operating systems, such as OS/2
Warp. As more applications become available for use with Windows,
Windows or Windows compatibility itself achieves the level of a de
facto standard.
As Windows compatibility approaches the level of a de facto
standard, rival operating systems face increasing pressure to achieve
Windows compatibility. As pointed out below, however, the growth
90. Note that aggressive sales behavior in an industry in which average cost declines with
output not only reduces the seller's costs, but it also raises its rivals' costs (as the rivals are
compelled to operate at higher regions on their average cost curves). It is especially important in
this kind of industrial setting to avoid careless references to antitrust theories concerned with
"raising rivals' costs", since those theories are not meant to apply to contexts like the present
one. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Stan Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Policy and Path Dependence: From
Qwerty to Windows 95, REGULAnON, 1995 Number 3, at 33; S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Mar-
golis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 205 (1995); S. J. Liebowitz
& Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSPECrIVES,
Spring 1994, at 133; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects,
J. EcorN. PERSPECTnVES, Spring 1994, at 93. The ramifications for antitrust policy of network
externalities are discussed in John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization,
and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision
Making, 40 AwrrmusT BULL 317, 347-62 (1995).
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of Windows-application programs does not necessarily disadvantage
rival operating systems, so long as they are fully Windows-compatible.
Rival systems can then compete, at least on the level that they can
claim to operate Windows applications as well or better than Windows
itself. The latter claim has been a mainstay of IBM's challenge to
Windows 3.1. 2
Although IBM has made its OS/2 systems compatible with Win-
dows 3.1 applications, the relative paucity of applications programs
designed specially for the OS/2 system detracts from the value of that
system as a 32-bit replacement for the DOS/Windows combination.93
The powerful 32-bit platform thus is reduced to operating 16-bit pro-
grams. This problem has now been exacerbated by the apparent in-
ability of OS/2 Warp to run 32-bit Windows programs, thus denying
OS/2 Warp users the benefit of applications programs designed for
Windows 95.94 The result is that network effects connected with Win-
dows 95 combined with IBM's less-than-astute marketing decision to
forfeit Windows 95 compatibility have strengthened Microsoft's lead
over IBM in these transitional systems.
These network effects reinforce the advantage secured by the
market leader from its declining average cost of production. The pro-
ducer who is ahead of its rivals (1) on the declining average cost curve,
and (2) on a rising curve of value created by network externalities, has
advantages which are increasingly difficult for its rivals to overcome.
These circumstances - present in varying degrees in the operating
systems industry - have analogues elsewhere. Intel Corporation, for
example, may have acquired such advantages. In the production of
microprocessors, research and development (and thus fixed costs)
play strong roles. Also, learning curve effects in semiconductor chip
production are apparently significant.95 The network externalities ef-
fect is also strong with respect to microprocessor production. As
more personal computers are equipped with Intel microprocessors,
software firms find it increasingly profitable to produce software for
those chips, thus in turn increasing the attractiveness of Intel
microprocessors to buyers.
92. Stan Miastkowski, OS/2 2.1: A User's Perspective, BYTE, Nov. 1993, at 97.
93. McCracken & Singh, supra note 14, at 146 ("OS/2 has failed to garner much support
from major Software developers, and its prospects are worrisome considering that most major
new programs are 32-bit Windows applications, which it can't run.").
94. Id. at 146 (observing that OS/2 Warp cannot run 32-bit Windows applications).
95. LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICr IN I-IGH-TECH-
NOLOGY INDUSTRIES 89 (1992). Unit production costs fall with accumulated production, primar-
ily because experience enables the producer to find ways of lowering the defect rate.
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3. Limitations of These Effects
The natural monopoly effect depends upon the relations among
fixed cost, price, and volume. High fixed costs are compatible with
several rival producers in an industry, as the steel and various other
capital-intensive industries illustrate. Even though increases in sales
volume decrease average unit cost indefinitely, the rate by which unit
cost falls continually declines. At large units of output, scale econo-
mies may be largely exhausted, the effect of further sales on unit cost
being minimal. Accordingly, the declining unit cost effect may not be
effective to capture the entire market for the market leader, thus leav-
ing room for rival suppliers of operating systems.
Similarly, the network externalities effect should not be exagger-
ated. There is a network externalities effect on the software available
for IBM-compatible machines versus that available for the Macintosh.
Most of the major applications programs, however, are available for
both IBM-compatible and Macintosh machines and many (especially
among business applications) that are available for the IBM-compati-
ble machines are available in both Windows and OS/2 Warp versions.
Apple/Macintosh commands 7.8% of the global personal computer
market 6 and thus is itself an attractive market for software producers.
Although OS/2 Warp and its predecessors probably command only
about 10% of the IBM-compatible computer market,97 the OS/2 fam-
ily commands a sizeable segment of the major corporate-user sub-
market. OS/2 Warp, therefore, is also an attractive market for
business applications producers and has at least the potential of be-
coming an attractive market for most applications producers. On the
basis of existing market shares, producing Windows versions will be
the first priority for applications companies.98 But Macintosh and OS/
2 Warp versions are also significant markets which can provide profits
for applications producers and thus are unlikely to be ignored by
them.
Although these matters of natural monopoly and network exter-
nalities (and the limitations upon these factors) de-emphasized in the
scenario which superficially underlies the Justice Department's posi-
tion, these matters could be relevant to an assessment of that position,
96. Next Task at Apple: First Order, Then Orders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A3.
97. Amy Cortese & Kathy Rebello, Can Microsoft's New Software line up to Expectations,
BUSINESS WEEK, July 17, 1995, at 36.
98. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 430.
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as some have argued.99 In raising these matters, the objective has not
been to criticize the Department, but merely to suggest the complexity
of the problem. As discussed immediately below, the Justice Depart-
ment has approached the exclusivity issue with sophistication.
F. The Sophistication of the Decree
While the exclusionary effects of the lump-sum license can be de-
bated in the manner set forth above, the Justice Department carefully
structured the prohibition of the lump-sum licenses to avoid the impo-
sition of substantial costs upon Microsoft. Microsoft is prohibited
from the use of per-processor licenses but it is not compelled to issue
only "per copy" licenses. 1°° Per-copy licenses would exacerbate the
monitoring problems which would be faced by Microsoft. Further-
more, monitoring problems are widely recognized as a chronic prob-
lem in certain intellectual property license situations. Indeed, the
Justice Department itself has explicitly noted that problem in its
guidelines for intellectual property licensing.' 0' Rather, under the de-
cree, Microsoft is free to issue "system" licenses, i.e., licenses for a
designated model of a personal computer.102 Since under a system
license, the licensee is effectively identifying to the world (by the
model name or number) a set of machines on which Microsoft operat-
ing systems have been installed, system licenses facilitate Microsoft's
monitoring task. Microsoft's royalty charge, however, cannot take the
form of a lump-sum payment. 10 3
The Department's objective thus lays in facilitating the divisibility
in the customer market which had previously been impeded by the
exclusive supply contracts. Because it believes that market imperfec-
tions hindered the emergence of specialized vendors for OS/2 Warp-
equipped personal computers, the equivalent divisibility is mandated
in the consent decree by loosening Microsoft's hold on its customers'
purchasers. This market divisibility is fostered by ensuring that each
computer manufacturer is free both to purchase from Microsoft and
99. Lopatka & Page, supra note 91, at 336 (describing the contentions of the anonymous
amici).
100. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Blair & Esquibel, supra note 88, at 261.
101. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note
81, § 4.1.2.
102. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096, at 75,244 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 1995) (Final Judgment I IV(G)). See also id. at 75,243 (Final Judgment 11(12)) (defin-
ing "per system license").
103. Id. at 75,245 (Final Judgment I IV(H)).
1996]
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to purchase from other suppliers as well. The Department has shown
its sensitivity to the monitoring problem by explicitly permitting per-
system licenses.10 4 The per-system licenses will increase Microsoft's
monitoring costs somewhat, but the added cost is probably minimal.
Balanced against the exclusionary effect, the Department plausibly
concluded that this minimal additional cost to Microsoft is outweighed
by the opening of the market to rival suppliers.
On the down side, the consent decree prevents Microsoft from
obtaining commitments for specified numbers of copies and elimi-
nates the lump-sum payment technique. As observed above,0 5 these
features in the license introduce greater flexibility into the short-run
price responsiveness of computer manufacturers. Under the decree,
license charges will become part of the marginal costs of computer
manufacturers and, under some circumstances, produce a reduction of
output.
V. CRITICAL PATH THEORY: THE DECREE AND RELATED ISSUES
A. The Deficiencies of Judge Sporkin's Normative Critique
In his ruling refusing to approve the consent decree, Judge
Sporkin revealed his concern about the increasing returns aspect of
the operating systems market.10 6 Referring to Professor Kenneth Ar-
row's affidavit submitted by the Government in support of the consent
decree, Judge Sporkin stated:
[T]he operating systems market is an increasing returns market. In
layman's terms that means that once a company has a monopoly
position, it is extremely hard to dislodge it.... If it is concededly
difficult to open up an increasing returns market to competition
once a company has obtained a monopoly position, the Govern-
ment has not shown how prospectively prohibiting violative conduct
that contributed to defendant's achieving its monopoly position will
serve to return the market to where it should have been absent its
anticompetitive practices. Simply telling a defendant to go forth
and sin no more does little or nothing to address the unfair advan-
tage it has already gained. 10 7
The position articulated by Judge Sporkin carries superficial plausibil-
ity. If Microsoft, for example, has entered into exclusive-supply con-
104. Id. at 75244 (Final Judgment I IV(G)).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
106. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 334 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
107. Id. (footnote omitted).
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tracts which conflict with antitrust norms, then it should not be
allowed to benefit from those transgressions. The assumptions under-
lying Judge Sporkin's comments are that the antitrust laws embody
well recognized norms and that breaches of those norms are properly
penalized. As applied to Microsoft, if its exclusive-supply contracts
breach antitrust norms, then they produce consequences which are
harmful to society and to Microsoft's competitors. Judge Sporkin
would, therefore, undo those breaches. He would restore both society
and Microsoft's competitors to the status quo ante.
Judge Sporkin's analysis, however, is problematic in several ways.
His assumption that the antitrust laws embody well recognized norms
is only partially true. There is a widespread recognition that price-
fixing cartels, allocation of markets among competitors, bid-rigging,
and other obviously anticompetitive behavior are illegal. But, the ex-
clusive-supply contracts entered into by Microsoft are not necessarily
unlawful. They have efficiency justifications. It is not immediately ap-
parent why IBM's computer manufacturing division may not provide
the needed outlet for IBM's operating system. This is not to say that
Microsoft's exclusive-supply agreements are necessarily lawful, either.
We are in an area in which there are plausible arguments to be made
on both sides. We do not know how a court would rule on their law-
fulness. When Microsoft and the Justice Department reached agree-
ment on the consent decree, a troublesome issue was resolved.
Microsoft agreed to a prospective prohibition on per-processor royal-
ties.' 0 8 However, it did not thereby agree that it had violated the law
in the past.
Indeed, one of the troublesome aspects of the Sherman Act is
that it is an open-textured statute, intentionally written by Congress to
be open to development by the courts,109 and yet it is open to applica-
tion as if the norms formulated only today have always been in effect.
This aspect of the Sherman Act is most troublesome in private actions
where plaintiffs recover treble damages, sometimes for conduct which
was widely believed to be lawful at the time it was performed. From
this perspective, the Federal Trade Commission Act is better struc-
tured.1 0 There, as in the Sherman Act, Congress openly admitted
that it was leaving to case-by-case adjudication the task of determin-
108. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71096, at 75,244 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 1995) (Final Judgment I% IV(C), Final Judgment IV(G)).
109. See RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 278, 288 (1985).
110. The Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to issue
cease-and-desist orders against unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or
practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
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ing the content of vaguely worded prohibitions.111 However, contrary
to the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act does not pro-
vide private parties an opportunity to collect damages,1 2 and the Act
itself operates entirely prospectively.
Thus, when we acknowledge that the unlawfulness of Microsoft's
behavior is being determined at the time of the consent decree, that its
effective characterization in the decree as unlawful is prospective only,
and even that prospective characterization takes place with the agree-
ment of Microsoft itself, the assumption underlying Judge Sporkin's
remarks - that the behavior transgressed preexisting norms. - is
seen as unfounded. This analysis merely recognizes the uncertainty
which permeates antitrust law at its boundaries. In addition, it also
recognizes the difficult task which the enforcement authorities per-
form. They must attempt to discern differences between socially effi-
cient and socially inefficient behavior - differences which, as applied,
often are perplexing even to skilled practitioners. Furthermore, they
have to do their utmost to ensure compliance with these newly deter-
mined behavioral standards.
Judge Sporkin's reference to "the unfair advantage [Microsoft]
has already gained""' 3 thus oversimplifies the process of norm formu-
lation. He gives no attention to the fact that the application of the
norms embodied in the consent decree was negotiated."14 Moreover,
Judge Sporkin assumes that if the antitrust laws are determined today
to bar Microsoft's exclusive-supply contracts, then the prohibition
must have always existed. Microsoft's advantages gained from the ex-
clusive supply contracts are "unfair" only if they violated the rules by
which it and its rivals played. But if those rules were indeterminate,
then it is difficult to maintain that Microsoft's advantages were
"unfair."
Finally, Judge Sporkin gives no attention at all to the ramifica-
tions of his approach on the deterrence of socially beneficial behavior.
To undo the "advantages" which Microsoft may have gained through
behavior not patently prohibited by the antitrust laws when per-
formed, might send a message to many other business firms to avoid
all behavior at the margins of antitrust prohibitions. Otherwise, the
111. See H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), reprinted in 5 FTC, THE LEOIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 4680, 4694 (Earl
W. Kintner ed., 1982).
112. See, e.g., American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 1992).
113. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 334 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 324.
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behavior of business firms may be undone by the courts years later,
with untoward costs. As a result, socially beneficial behavior would
be deterred. Society would then be the loser.
B. The General Inadequacy of Path Dependence Theory as a Basis
for Judicial Restructuring
1. The Theory
Critics other than Judge Sporkin have been troubled by the par-
ticular characteristics of the operating systems industry. Employing
the network externalities effect with critical path theory, they have
formulated a special critique of Microsoft. 115 They argue that as a
company providing an operating system (such as Microsoft) expands
its sales, that company's product becomes increasingly attractive to
customers. As a result, rival operating systems will increasingly lose
their attractiveness because of the network effect. For example, as
more people use Windows, Windows grows in value because the large
number of Windows systems outstanding, in turn, generates more
Windows-compatible applications." 6 These so-called network effects
increase as more computer users adopt Microsoft operating systems.
Thus, Microsoft is proceeding down a "critical path" in which its prod-
uct is increasingly more attractive to potential buyers, just because it is
used by so many others. The company which is furthest along on this
critical path to success has an advantage over rivals which becomes
ever-more difficult for rivals to overcome.
The critical path theory underlying this analysis was originally de-
veloped by Stanford University Professor Brian Arthur in the late
1980s. 117 The theory is concerned with how small and even accidental
events may determine later history. As applied to Microsoft, the the-
ory uses network externalities which puts an early leader, such as
115. See GARY REBACK ET AL., (WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI), WHITE PAPER:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES REGARDING MICROSOFr'S BUSINESS
STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED ACourSmON OF INTUIT, INC., pt. IV (Nov. 14, 1994)
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (originally on the Internet, on file with author) (Economic
Evaluation).
116. This critique of Microsoft was incorporated in the Government's Complaint. Complaint
17, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
1995) (Civ. A. 94-156420). The "network externalities" theory underlying this critique figured
prominently in the brief submitted to Judge Sporkin on behalf of anonymous amid. See Lopatka
& Page, supra note 94, at 336.
117. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Histori-
cal Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, Sci.
AM., Feb. 1990, at 92.
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Microsoft, on a track - or critical path - in which marketing success
breeds further success in the manner described above.
These observers thus posit that a single operating system is likely
to emerge as the de facto standard as a result of these network effects
and critical path theory. There is, of course, a value in standardiza-
tion. Standardization allows different manufacturers to provide parts
and supplies to owners of various brands of equipment. In the world
of computer software, standardization of operating systems reduces
the costs of applications suppliers and facilitates communication
among users by allowing one person's files to be run on another's
machine. Moreover, it enables offices to establish in-house networks,
facilitating communication among units.
The problem these observers identify is not the emergence of a
single operating system as a standard. Rather, it is that the resulting
operating system may not be the best of the available systems. Thus
IBM's OS/2 Warp may be a technically superior system, yet network
effects may advantage Windows 95 over OS/2 Warp, with the result
that Windows 95 becomes the de facto standard.
2. Application of the Theory to Microsoft
Microsoft critics who employ the language of path dependence
often de-emphasize Microsoft's contributions in the way of imagina-
tion, marketing skill, product development, and programming know-
how to its present dominant position in the software industry." 8
Rather, using path dependence language to invoke the notion that
merely trivial or accidental events may control later events, the critics
point to certain events in the late 1970s and early 1980s as setting
Microsoft on the path to dominance: (1) Microsoft's acquisition of
QDOS, a clone of Digital Research's CP/M 8-bit operating system;" 9
and (2) IBM's selection of Microsoft as an operating systems supplier
for the original IBM personal computer. These events are depicted as
trivial or accidental occurrences which are responsible for Microsoft's
success.
It is clear these events played a significant role in Microsoft's suc-
cess. Yet what these critics tend to deemphasize are other major con-
tributing causes to Microsoft's success, many or most of which are
properly attributable to Microsoft's own imagination, shrewd business
behavior, and astute marketing. Thus, the critics seldom mention that,
118. See REBACK ET AL., supra note 115, pt. IV (Economic Evaluation).
119. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 91, at 322.
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first, when IBM needed a commitment for an operating system for its
personal computer, Microsoft made such a system available - no
small feat, given the state of the software industry at the time. In pro-
viding the needed operating system, Microsoft stepped in where Digi-
tal Research (which was then working on a 16-bit operating system)
was unable to commit to providing such a system within IBM's re-
quired timeframe. Within that timeframe, Microsoft located a suitable
system, secured rights to it, and adapted the system to the IBM per-
sonal computer. 12
0
Second, the original version of the IBM personal computer was
shipped with a choice of three operating systems: the Microsoft sys-
tem, CP/M-86, and the USCD Pascal P-System.121 The agreement be-
tween Microsoft and IBM provided IBM with rights to market MS-
DOS with its machines for a one-time fee. 22 This provided IBM with
an incentive to sell MS-DOS to buyers of its personal computers at a
substantially lower price than the alternative operating systems. As a
result, most buyers opted for MS-DOS. MS-DOS then rapidly be-
came the standard for all IBM-compatible personal computers. The
point here is that it was the low prices to the ultimate consumers
which induced them to opt for MS-DOS over alternative systems. Ac-
cording to Bill Gates, 23 Microsoft's president, this was shrewd mar-
keting strategy. By providing IBM with an incentive to promote MS-
DOS and thus ensure its widespread use, Microsoft was able to mar-
ket MS-DOS to independent producers of IBM-compatible machines.
In so doing, of course, Microsoft was exploiting "network externali-
ties" that were created by IBM's promotion of MS-DOS. Yet it was
no "trivial event" or "accident" that pushed the adoption of Microsoft
operating systems. Rather, in this particular instance, it was
Microsoft's astute marketing. It was, moreover, astute marketing
120. In 1980, Digital Research was working on a 16-bit version of its 8-bit CP/M operating
system. The development of the 16-bit version, the CP/M-86, was beset with substantial delays
in completing that project. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 154-56. It appears that IBM
would have gone with the CP/M-86 had Digital Research been able and willing to commit to
IBM's time frame. Id. at 156. Digital Research's delays afforded Microsoft anx opportunity to
supply an operating system to IBM for its personal computer. Seattle Computer (through its
Tim Patterson) developed a rudimentary CP/M clone (QDOS, later marketed as 86-DOS) which
would operate on a 16-bit platform. Microsoft secured rights to 86-DOS from Seattle Computer,
which it then adapted to the IBM personal computer. Id. at 168-70. After first securing a license
for 86-DOS, Microsoft later purchased 86-DOS outright from Seattle Computer. Id. at 174-75.
121. GATES, supra note 13, at 48-49.
122. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 162; GATES, supra note 13, at 48-49.
123. GATES, supra note 13, at 49.
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which provided the public with a high quality operating system at a
lower price than alternative operating systems.
Third, Microsoft also provided a graphic user interface for IBM-
compatible personal computers ("Windows") when one was needed.
Microsoft did not originate the graphic user interface. Xerox had
done that with the Xerox "Star," a technological marvel but
uneconomically priced and limited in its performance capabilities. 24
Apple had developed a graphic user interface for its unsuccessful
"Lisa" and its successful "Macintosh," and Apple's technology was
used to a significant degree by Microsoft in its Windows system.' 25
But while other companies originated the technology, Microsoft
brought it into play and succeeded in the market. Apple did not meet
the pent-up demand for a graphical user interface for IBM-compatible
personal computers because it kept the technology for Apple ma-
chines. Indeed, Apple failed to exploit the Macintosh itself, by refus-
ing to license clones. Microsoft's adaption of a graphical user
interface for IBM-compatible personal computers met that demand.
When Windows was introduced, other companies were offering com-
peting products. IBM, for example, was offering its "Topview," a
character-based windows and multitasking system.'26 But Windows
ultimately prevailed in competition with these rival systems.
Fourth, Microsoft is currently leading the transition from a 16-bit
platform standard to a 32-bit standard in its Windows 95, thus again
offering consumers a product which meets a recognized need. IBM,
which had earlier introduced its own 32-bit platform in its OS/2 2.0,
2.1 and OS/2 Warp operating systems, had not neglected the problem
of transition, but because it had not yet succeeded in capturing a ma-
jor share of the nonbusiness market, its contribution to moving con-
sumers from the 16-bit platform to a 32-bit platform has been limited.
IBM recognized the transitional problem by making its OS/2 2.0, 2.1
and OS/2 Warp systems compatible with Windows 3.0 and 3.1 applica-
tions. Yet despite the backward compatibility of these systems,12 7
they have not, as yet, succeeded in capturing a major segment of the
consumer market. Indeed, IBM was not able to make a major break-
through into the consumer market during the nine months between
124. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 182.
125. Id. at 291-93.
126. Id. at 266-67.
127. Although OS/2 2.1 was a powerful 32-bit system, one critic observed that it ran 16-bit
programs more slowly than Windows 3.1. Consumers with a base of 16-bit programs thus might
decide not to move to a 32-bit system immediately. Udell, supra note 17, at 85.
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the introduction of OS/2 Warp in October 1994 and Microsoft's intro-
duction, in August 1995, of its own transitional system in Windows 95.
Until recently widespread consumer appreciation of the potential
benefits of a 32-bit system has been largely lacking. Microsoft's intro-
duction and promotion of Windows 95 have raised the level of con-
sumer awareness about the benefits of 32-bit systems. Thus some of
the consumer inertia in moving to a 32-bit system - which has ham-
pered IBM's sales of OS/2 Warp - may be eroding, due in part to the
promotional efforts of Microsoft itself. Conversely, however, IBM
may be making a strategic marketing mistake in so far failing to make
OS/2 Warp compatible with Windows 95 applications. As noted
above, IBM has previously been sensitive to the transitional problem:
OS/2 Warp and earlier OS/2 versions were made compatible with
Windows 3.0 and 3.1 applications. With Microsoft's introduction of
Windows 95, it is no longer adequate for OS/2 Warp to run Windows
3.1 programs: It must run Windows 95 programs as well.'2 8
If Windows 95 prevails over its competition, there will be strong
grounds for believing that its success can be attributed to the better
ability of Microsoft to judge the market, and to design an operating
system which conforms to prevailing felt needs of consumers at the
time of its introduction. Incompatibility between OS/2 Warp and
Windows 95 programs is likely to impede the sale of the former.
Microsoft's success so far and its potential for further success appear
due to its high quality product, its superior marketing and timing,
combined with some strategic mistakes by its principal rival.
The several events referred to above do not constitute an exhaus-
tive list of the various ways in which Microsoft has met consumer
needs that were either unmet or met less well in rival products. Its
current success is also due to continuous work in improving and up-
grading its products. Thus, while IBM's selection of Microsoft as the
supplier of an operating system for the original IBM personal com-
puter was an important factor in Microsoft's success, that was not the
only factor. Indeed, the selection of Microsoft as the provider of that
operating system itself was not the product of chance, but of
Microsoft's ability to provide a needed good at a crucial time. 2 9 Criti-
cal factors in Microsoft's success have been its own creative contribu-
tions to product development and improvement as well as astute
marketing. It is thus false to attribute Microsoft's success to the kind
of "trivial" or "accidental" events that critical path theory shows can
128. Jon Udell, Why IBM Should License Win32, B'r, Sept. 1994, at 278.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 119-122.
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affect later results. Critical path theory also shows that major events
can shape the critical path and the position of particular firms on that
path.
C. Changes in Technology
1. The Impact of Technological Change Upon the Critical
Path
When major technical changes are made, rivals who have lagged
behind the leader often have the opportunity to start the race anew.
For example, when networking became technologically feasible, the
market opened to providers of networking. Novell Inc., at that time,
seized the opportunities made available by developing technology,
outpacing both Microsoft and IBM. 130
The industry is presently in the process of moving from a 16-bit
platform to a 32-bit platform. This shift in technology provides a
broad opportunity for providers of operating systems geared to a 32-
bit platform. Windows 95 and Windows NT both operate on a 32-bit
platform; so does IBM's OS/2 Warp. As noted above, when OS/2
Warp and its 32-bit OS/2 predecessors were introduced, the nonbusi-
ness public was largely unaware of the advantages of a 32-bit operat-
ing system. This impediment may be in the process of disappearing, as
the very marketing of Windows 95 itself generates a widespread
awareness of the potential benefits of such a system. Microsoft -
astute marketer as ever - is attempting to use Windows 95 as a tran-
sitional system to wean users away from an earlier 16-megabyte MS-
DOS/Windows system ultimately to its own 32-bit Windows NT sys-
tem through the sophisticated transitional Windows 95. Microsoft can
be seen as leveraging the popularity of its Windows system to sell
Windows 95. But that leveraging is not leveraging economic power.
It is purely shrewd marketing.
Computer users who understand that the industry is moving to a
32-bit operating system platform understand that Windows 95 is a
transitional system. They will or will not adopt Windows 95 on its
short-term merits. Indeed, they may choose instead to bypass Win-
dows 95 and to install a full nontransitional 32-bit operating system
immediately in the form of IBM's OS/2 Warp or (if they have the
requisite RAM at their disposal) Microsoft's NT. In any event, the
movement to a new 32-bit standard has a potential market-opening
effect. So long as IBM's 32-bit operating system is backwards compat-
130. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 268.
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ible with Windows 3.1 applications programs (and runs those pro-
grams as well as Windows 95), there is no a priori reason why the
Microsoft system will become the new industry standard. Under those
conditions, both OS/2 Warp and Windows 95 start afresh.
Suppose, however, that the very success of the earlier Windows
3.1, combined with the favorable reviews of Windows 95, impels appli-
cations producers en masse to develop many new 32-bit Windows ap-
plications, thus engendering a network-effects advantage for Windows
95. It is then open to IBM, in these circumstances, to introduce Win-
dows 95 compatibility into its OS/2 Warp system, thus canceling that
network-effects advantage. Were IBM to introduce that compatibil-
ity, OS/2 Warp would again be in the running. Its eventual market
share would depend upon how successful IBM was at convincing users
of the relative technical advantages of its own system over that of
Microsoft's. Indeed, since the Justice Department has successfully
opened the computer-manufacturer market to Microsoft rivals,' 3 ' an
OS/2 Warp with Windows 95 compatibility could aspire to become an
original-equipment option on non-IBM brand machines (as well as on
IBM-brand machines), a development which could significantly in-
crease OS/2 Warp's market share. In short, each time that the indus-
try takes a major technological step forward - as it is now doing in
moving from a 16-bit platform to a 32-bit platform - the market
opens wider to the provider with the best technology (and the best
marketing). Even when the preexisting leader's reputation generates
network effects for its own version of the new technology (as may be
occurring in the case of Windows 95), its rivals nonetheless may offset
those network advantages by making their own products compatible
with the leader's. Microsoft, as the industry leader, nonetheless re-
tains advantages. Microsoft's continuing large market share (in an in-
dustry in which most costs lay in research and development) means
that its unit costs are lower than that of IBM's. Its large market share
means that it can distribute its advertising costs over a larger volume
of sales. Yet these advantages are not disabling to a determined and
resourceful challenger such as IBM.
The network effects, such as large accumulations of software ap-
plications by users - turn out to be illusory in substantial part. So
long as Windows compatibility is open to rival systems, these systems
do not incur a critical disadvantage. Accumulations of Windows ap-
plications are not an a priori reason for a purchaser to select a Win-
131. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
1995) (Final Judgment).
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dows system, if other systems will run those applications. Moreover,
existing applications software will soon be obsolete, regardless of
which operating system predominates. Most applications programs
are in a continuous state of development themselves. Furthermore,
this normal scenario of periodic technological obsolescence will be ac-
celerated as most applications programs will be redone to take advan-
tage of the 32-bit platform. Second, IBM can dissipate any advantage
that Microsoft might possess from the existing software applications
base and from new base of 32-bit Windows applications by making
OS/2 Warp with interfaces for both Windows 95 and Windows 3.1, so
that it will run applications systems designed for both Windows sys-
tems. Third, as an antitrust matter, the accumulated software base for
Windows should be largely irrelevant. The accumulated software base
is an advantage to Microsoft only insofar as Microsoft is able to per-
suade new users that the accumulated software base designed for
Microsoft's 16-bit platform (which is likely to become rapidly obso-
lete) is a reason for adopting Microsoft's 32-bit platform. If all sys-
tems are Windows compatible, Microsoft's persuasive efforts will fall
flat. There is no "market power" in any traditional sense of the term
involved in this effort of persuasion. This is pure marketing. IBM is
perfectly capable of countering Microsoft's persuasive efforts. Indeed,
by introducing full compatibility with Windows 95 as well as with Win-
dows 3.1, IBM can neutralize any advantage otherwise conferred upon
Microsoft as a result of large bases of Windows-compatible applica-
tions. Clearly the antitrust laws should not become involved in a pro-
motional contest between Microsoft and IBM.
2. Moving from One Level of Technology to Another
Prior to 1981, when the original IBM personal computer was in-
troduced, most personal computers operated with an 8-bit
microprocessor. 3 ' IBM's initial offering in the personal computer
market used an Intel 8088 16-bit microprocessor. 133 When the IBM
personal computer succeeded commercially, it brought the personal
computer industry to a new and higher level of technology.13 4 This
technological shift, however, required an operating system geared to
the new and more powerful microprocessor. Microsoft, participating
in this technological transition, provided such a operating system. It
did so by modifying a product which it had purchased from another
132. See GATES, supra note 13, at 48.
133. GATES, supra note 13, at 48; MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 153.
134. See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 152-53; see also GATES, supra note 13, at 48.
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company.13 5 When IBM first marketed its new personal computer, it
offered customers a choice of operating systems for its personal com-
puter, only one of which was supplied by Microsoft. Microsoft rapidly
became the standard, however, because its MS-DOS was priced sub-
stantially lower than the rival systems. 136 In short, Microsoft - along
with IBM and Intel - played a significant role in assisting the per-
sonal computer industry to move from an 8-bit platform to a 16-bit
platform.
Another later technological advancement occurred when the in-
dustry moved from typewritten commands to graphic user interfaces.
In the 1980s, Xerox and Apple had developed graphic user interfaces
for their commercially unsuccessful Xerox "Star" and Apple "Lisa"
personal computers.137 Subsequently, in 1984, Apple introduced the
highly successful Macintosh line of personal computers, all of which
employed a graphic user interface of the type earlier employed in the
Lisa. This user interface employed a series of images (or "icons") as
tools through which users selected the programs which they wished to
operate. Microsoft, under a license from Apple, then developed a
graphic user interface for IBM-compatible personal computers, which
it named "Windows." At the time of the introduction of Windows,
Microsoft was faced with competition from other developers. An im-
portant rival was IBM's character-based windows called "Topview. ' 138
Windows, however, triumphed in the market. Initially shipped in
1985, Windows attained widespread acceptance with version 3.1.
Within two years of its introduction in April, 1991, over 35% of all
personal computers shipped (including non-IBM-compatible personal
computers) were equipped with Windows.139 Providers of applica-
tions programs rapidly generated Windows versions of those pro-
grams. Soon Windows became a de facto standard user interface. By
the early 1990s, most IBM-compatible personal computers ran on MS-
DOS as their operating system, and employed Windows as an MS-
DOS overlay providing a user-friendly graphic user interface.
What is noteworthy about these events is that IBM-compatible
personal computers needed a graphical user interface to meet the
needs of consumers for easy operation. That need became apparent
135. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also GATES, supra note 13, at 48-49;
MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 157-63. -
136. See supra text accompanying note 127; see also GATES supra note 13, at 49.
137. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 182-83; GATES, supra note 13, at 53.
138. MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 266-67.
139. See Baseman et al., supra note 8, at 273 (reporting the underlying figures).
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when Apple developed the Lisa and Macintosh user interfaces. Ap-
ple, however, made no attempt to expand its successful Macintosh sys-
tems to the IBM-compatible sector of the market. And by refusing to
license others to manufacture its hardware, Apple ensured that the
Macintosh operating system would be available only on Apple-manu-
factured machines. These decisions both limited the reach of the Mac-
intosh operating system and did nothing to alleviate the need in the
IBM-compatible sector for a graphic user interface. Microsoft met
this need by providing the public, through its new Windows program,
the new capability it needed. Most applications providers were able
to provide Windows' versions of their software. By providing Win-
dows as a DOS overlay, Microsoft was able to smooth the transition
from a purely MS-DOS based system to a more user-friendly com-
bined MS-DOS/Windows system.
The personal computer marketplace is presently in another tran-
sition. It is in the process of moving from a 16-bit platform to a 32-bit
platform. 4 ° MS-DOS was an operating system which was geared to a
16-bit platform. IBM introduced a 32-bit operating system in its OS/2
2.0, 2.1 and OS/2 Warp, and Microsoft responded with its own 32-bit
system, Windows NT. So far, however, neither the OS/2 systems nor
Windows NT has obtained a major share of the nonbusiness market.
Microsoft's "Windows 95" is a transitional program designed to
overcome consumer reluctance to move to a 32-bit platform. Win-
dows 95 requires only 8 megabytes of RAM to perform well and will
operate with 4 megabytes of RAM. 14 Windows 95 thus enables com-
puter users easily to switch to a 32-bit platform as they replace their
existing equipment with current off-the-shelf hardware, almost all of
which currently bears a minimum of 8 megabytes of RAM. Ulti-
mately, as more powerful hardware comes on line, Microsoft probably
hopes that Windows NT will become the standard operating system.
Note, however, what Microsoft is doing with Windows 95; it is facili-
tating the movement of personal computer users and their suppliers
from a 16-bit platform to a 32-bit platform. Computer users as well as
applications providers can move gradually through Windows 95.
Computer manufacturers can gradually increase the power of their
machines and gradually increase the amount of RAM which they rou-
tinely install. A sudden general switch to a 32-bit platform would be
difficult for computer users and their suppliers alike. IBM's OS/2
Warp initially failed to make major inroads against Microsoft in the
140. See supra part IV.C.1.
141. See Diehl, supra note 20.
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consumer market because consumers did not initially appreciate the
advantages of a 32-bit system. With its Windows 95, Microsoft has
done something which IBM has failed to do; it is providing a bridge to
a full 32-bit platform.
VI. Is THIS LEVERAGING OR FACILITATING?
Critics of Microsoft complain that Microsoft has "leveraged" its
position in MS-DOS to sell Windows. 4 2 Similar arguments can be
constructed alleging that Microsoft has leveraged its position in Win-
dows to sell Windows 95. That is perhaps true. However, there are
various ways to describe developments in personal computer operat-
ing systems. As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, Microsoft has
facilitated the movement of personal computer users and their suppli-
ers from an 8-bit platform standard to a 16-bit platform standard. 14 3
It has facilitated another transition from a verbally-based user inter-
face to a graphic user interface standard. Currently, Microsoft -
through Windows 95 - is facilitating a transition from a 16-bit plat-
form to a 32-bit platform.
When it is said that Microsoft is leveraging its position in one
software segment to advance its position in another, those statements
reflect two realities, only one of which is generally emphasized. Of
course, when Microsoft markets Windows 95, it stresses Windows 95's
compatibility with applications programs which have been designed
for preexisting versions of Windows, such as Windows 3.1. This com-
patibility is good for Microsoft because it aids the sales of Windows
95. But it aids the sales of Windows 95 precisely because consumers
want their transitional operating system to run their current inventory
of applications programs. In this instance (as in others), Microsoft has
benefitted itself by providing a service desired by consumers. This is
an example of a market operating as we expect it to operate.
VII. MICROSOFT's ACQUISITION OF INTUIT
In 1994 Microsoft entered into a merger agreement with Intuit,
the producer of Quicken, the most successful application program for
financial planning. During 1994, Quicken was the most popular of the
financial planning software programs, occupying about 70% of the fi-
142. See REBACK ET AL, supra note 115, pt. III(B).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136.
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nancial planning software market."' Microsoft's own competing
"Money" program was the runner-up with about 22% of the mar-
ket. 145 In order not to run afoul of the antitrust laws governing hori-
zontal acquisitions, however, Microsoft offered to divest itself of most
of Money's assets by transfer to Novell. As a result, Microsoft would
own Quicken, Novell would own Money, and they would continue to
be in competition.
A. The Justice Department's Opposition to the Microsoft/Intuit
Merger
After significant pressures upon the Justice Department exerted
by Microsoft's competitors, 146 several United States Senators, 47 and
public expression of concern by the banking industry, 48 the Depart-
ment decided to challenge the Microsoft/Intuit merger. As a result of
Justice Department opposition, Microsoft and Intuit called off their
planned merger.' 49 Microsoft also canceled its planned transfer of
"Money" assets to Novell.
The rationale for the Justice Department's challenge to the
Microsoft/Intuit merger was not immediately clear. Assistant Attor-
ney General Anne Bingaman explained the Department's opposition
as follows:
Allowing Microsoft to buy a dominant position in this highly
concentrated market would likely result in higher prices for con-
sumers who want to buy personal finance software and would cause
those buyers to miss out on the huge benefits from innovation,"....
"Moreover, Microsoft's control of that market will give it a cor-
nerstone asset that could be used with its existing dominant position
in operating systems for personal computers to seize control of the
markets of the future, including PC-based home banking.' ' 50
The basis for the Department's opposition to Microsoft "buying" In-
tuit's "dominant position" needs further explanation. No new domi-
144. Merger Raises Division Concerns in Personal Finance Software Market, 68 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1711, at 581 (May 4, 1995) [hereinafter Merger Raises Division
Concerns].
145. Id.
146. See REBACK ET AL, supra note 115.
147. Senators Howard Metzenbaum, Paul Simon, and Edward Kennedy wrote Anne Bin-
gaman, asking that the Justice Department look more closely into the longer-term implications
of the merger. COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 5, 1994, at 8.
148. Terence P. Pare, Why the Banks Lined Up Against Gates, FORTUNE, May 29, 1995, at 18.
149. Microsoft and Intuit Abandon Merger Challenged by Division, 68 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1714, at 672 (May 25, 1995).
150. Merger Raises Division Concerns, supra note 144, at 581.
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nant position results from the Microsoft/Intuit merger. Intuit's
Quicken already has a dominant position, with its 70% share of the
financial planning market. Whether Quicken is owned by Intuit or by
Microsoft does not change that 70% share. The Department perhaps
thinks that a 70% share owned by Microsoft is more dangerous than a
70% share owned by Intuit. If that is the Department's position, then
the public needs an explanation. Does the Department believe that
Microsoft's greater wealth makes its ownership of Quicken more of a
threat to competition than Intuit's ownership? Anne Bingaman re-
portedly stated that the transfer of Money and related assets to Novell
would not fix the problem of reduced competition because Novell
could never match Microsoft's financial might.151 Such a statement, if
made, sounds much like the "deep pocket" antitrust analysis of the
1960s, which became formalized in the doctrine of "entrenchment." Is
the Justice Department's challenge to the Microsoft/Intuit merger a
disinterring of these older - and, some would say, archaic - doc-
trines, doctrines long believed to have been abandoned years ago?152
B. Entrenchment and Related Doctrines
Back in the 1960s, the Supreme Court once believed that the ac-
quisition of a dominant firm in an industry by an especially wealthy
acquiring corporation was likely to "entrench" the dominant firm fur-
ther into its position of dominance. The apparent rationale was that
the addition of wealth to a position of dominance would make the
dominant firm a stronger competitor than it already was. Justice
Douglas expressed this view in his opinion condemning Procter &
Gamble's acquisition of Clorox.' 5 3 In his opinion for the Court,
Douglas expressed the view that the addition of Procter & Gamble's
resources to Clorox, the dominant firm in the bleach industry (with
151. Don Clark & Viveca Novak, U.S. Files Antitrust Suit to Stop Microsoft From Its $2.1
Billion Acquisition of Intuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1995, at A3, A6.
152. The Justice Department abandoned the entrenchment doctrine when it issued its 1982
merger guidelines. See, e.g., E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency:
An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997, 1028 (1986); Joseph P. Bauer, Gov-
ernment Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate
Mergers?, 71 CAL- L. REv. 348, 369 (1983) (noting the omission of entrenchment as a factor in
evaluating mergers under the 1982 guidelines). Commenting upon the 1968 merger guidelines'
inclusion of the entrenchment doctrine, Donald Turner (under whose supervision the 1968
guidelines had been issued) stated that those guidelines "were on much shakier ground, to say
the least, in their concern with ... so-called entrenchment." Donald F. Turner, Observations on
the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Merger Guidelines, 51 ANTITRusT L.J. 307, 307 (1982).
Accord Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75
CAL. L. REV. 797, 807 (1987).
153. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967).
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48.8% of national bleach sales), would be likely to dissuade Clorox's
rivals from competing aggressively. 154 According to Douglas, smaller
rivals would become more cautious in competing because Clorox's
ability to retaliate would be strengthened by the addition of Procter &
Gamble's resources.5 5 Since the 1960s, antitrust observers have iden-
tified serious problems with entrenchment as a factor for evaluating a
merger. A serious drawback is that "entrenchment" would invalidate
a merger which was efficient, thereby enlisting the antitrust laws in a
misallocation of society's assets. It is also difficult to see how the
wealth of a firm can become the basis for barring its acquisition of a
business through purchase but not through internal expansion. The
analysis which makes this distinction must assume that the resources
of the acquiring firm would be employed anticompetitively in the for-
mer situation but not in the latter. These problematic aspects of the
doctrine were responsible for its demise. When the Justice Depart-
ment issued its 1982 merger guidelines, it dropped all reference to en-
trenchment. 5 6 Few judicial decisions have employed entrenchment
analysis since the mid 1970s.' 57 Until the recent Microsoft investiga-
tion, the enforcement agencies have also ignored the doctrine. 58
Another possibility is that the Department believes that
Microsoft could exploit Quicken's potential more effectively than In-
tuit because Microsoft possesses other software capabilities which,
when combined with the Quicken software, would enhance Quicken's
position, possibly further expanding its already large market share.
Such a view would be a version of the entrenchment doctrine,
although at a more sophisticated level. Here, it is not merely the addi-
tion of wealth, as in a deep-pocket version of entrenchment, but the
addition of other resources possessed by the acquiring company. This
version of entrenchment was also incorporated in the Court's opinion
in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.'"9 There, in addition to his focus
upon Procter & Gamble's wealth, Justice Douglas wrote that Procter
& Gamble's ability to garner advertising discounts from the media
154. Id. at 578-79.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 152.
157. See, e.g., John DeQ. Briggs, Mergers and Acquisitions: An Outline of General Principles,
Current Enforcement Practices, and Recent Contested Cases, 56 ANTrrRUST L.J. 675, 699 (1988).
158. In 1983, Donald Baker and William Blumenthal described the omission of entrench-
ment and reciprocity analysis in the then recently issued 1982 merger guidelines as "accurately
reflecting the unwillingness of several successive administrations to bring such cases." Donald I.
Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311,
339 (1983).
159. 386 U.S. 568, 573 (1967).
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was the kind of resource which, when added to Clorox's powerful po-
sition, would help to dissuade others from entering the bleach
industry. 160
C. The Purchasing-Market-Share Objection
One objection to Microsoft's acquisition of Intuit relates to the
combination of Quicken's large installed base with Microsoft's com-
plementary assets. The concern may be that access to this larger base
would facilitate Microsoft's ability to offer upgrades enhanced with
bill-paying capabilities or upgrades which were otherwise enhanced
with complementary Microsoft products. The model underlying this
scenario is the Microsoft Office, which combines wordprocessing
(Microsoft Word for Windows 6.0), spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel),
electronic mail (Microsoft Mail), database management (Access),
presentations (PowerPoint), project management (Project), and calen-
daring (Schedule+). The "bundle" of programs is especially attractive
to users, since it heightens their productivity, often beyond the sum of
what each program could accomplish by itself. Moreover, the bundle
sells for a price significantly less than the sum of the prices of the
individual programs. Other companies offer similar office "suites,"
such as the "Lotus Smart Suite" and "Wordperfect Office."
Following the example of the Microsoft Office, Microsoft might
combine Quicken in a bundle with its Office or in a bundle designed
for home applications, thereby enhancing Quicken's attractiveness
and further enlarging its market share. By bundling Quicken with
other software, Microsoft may be providing new value to consumers,
and by creating new bundles, consumers may incur lower out-of-
pocket costs for software values. A recent commentary in Fortune
magazine suggested that many banking institutions were concerned
about Microsoft's acquisition of Quicken, because they saw it as facil-
itating Microsoft's entry into the provision of banking services.16'
With time, Microsoft would make use of its complementary capabili-
ties in electronic mail, bank clearinghouse business, and banking
software. Ultimately, as the Fortune commentary put it, "[b]anks, at
least for cybersurfers, would become what they really are anyway:
providers of commodity services, doomed to compete on price.'
'1 62
Microsoft's potential threat to banks - like its potential threat to
rivals elsewhere - seems to be a threat based on the provision of
160. Id. at 579.
161. Pare, supra note 148, at 18.
162. Id.
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greater value at lower prices. This sounds like greater competition for
banks. Microsoft, of course, in the instances referred to above, is able
to provide greater value to consumers because it is able to provide
complementary services in a package which many of its rivals cannot
emulate. From the perspective of a Microsoft rival which offers a sin-
gle software applications line, Microsoft's ability to package products
together to provide greater value to consumers may seem "unfair."
Thus, in a "white paper"'163 submitted to the Justice Department by
opponents of the Microsoft/Intuit merger, Microsoft was said to be
"leveraging" its capability in one line of software into other, related
lines of software, behavior which was seen as unfair. Yet consumers
benefit when they receive greater value for the same expenditure.
Microsoft's bundling of complementary programs and otherwise ex-
ploiting synergistic capabilities are efficiencies which increase the
value of its output and thus make a contribution to the enhancement
of national wealth. The courts have long recognized that the use by a
single firm of complementary technologies to provide a superior line
of products or services is not unfair, even though it may disadvantage
that firm's rivals who have access to only one such technology.6 In-
deed, the exploitation of the complementary technologies is exactly
the behavior which the antitrust laws are designed to encourage.
D. The New Entrenchment Doctrine: A Critical Path Officially
Imposed
As we have seen, Microsoft's attempt to replace its Money finan-
cial planning program with Quicken was thwarted by Justice Depart-
ment opposition. Under the scenario envisioned by Microsoft, it
would have acquired Quicken, while spinning off Money to Novell.
The result would be the continued competition of the two leading fi-
nancial planning programs, except that Quicken would have become
Microsoft's player while Money would have become Novell's. The
Department opposed this arrangement because it feared that
Microsoft's resources behind Quicken would have created a competi-
tive threat. We have observed, however, that the mere addition of
Microsoft's resources to Quicken could not have created any danger
to competition. What Microsoft could have gained from acquiring
Quicken, however, would have been a larger installed base in financial
163. See REBACK ET AL,, supra note 115.
164. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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planning software. By upgrading this large base, Microsoft could have
provided links between the large base of Quicken users and other pro-
grams. Thus, as pointed out above, Microsoft might expand the size of
its bill-paying and bank-services venture more rapidly by operating
through the larger base of Quicken than through the smaller base of
Money.
Let us be clear in our terminology. Exploiting potential links
among the technologies available to a firm is generally procompeti-
tive. It enables a firm to offer consumers a package of services which
otherwise would not have been available to them at all or, if available,
only at higher costs. Some of Microsoft's critics have phrased
Microsoft's exploitation of technological linkages as "leveraging.' '1 65
They thus speak of Microsoft "leveraging" its capability in financial
planning software into the provision of banking services. 166 The Eng-
lish language certainly is flexible enough to incorporate this usage of
the verb "to lever," or its participle, "leveraging." But care must be
taken in such use. "Leveraging" has a history of use in the antitrust
context. There it has been employed to describe the purported exten-
sion of monopoly power from one market to another. 67 Indeed,
"leveraging," in antitrust discourse, is synonymous with anticompeti-
tive behavior. When used to denote the exploitation of synergies by
software providers such as Microsoft or Lotus, however, the term is
being employed in a different context and connotations of anticompe-
titive behavior which might carry over from the antitrust context are
misleading. 168 Indeed, the core concept of antitrust leveraging lies in
tying, where a seller with a monopoly on one good uses that monopoly
to "force" buyers to take unwanted goods in a second market at
supracompetitive prices. 169 Thus "leveraging" involves a restriction of
output. But in the case of software providers, like Microsoft and Lo-
tus, extra value is being provided which enriches consumers and con-
tributes to an expansion of output.
When the Justice Department challenged the Microsoft/Intuit
merger and thereby thwarted Microsoft's acquisition of Quicken, it
did so under the rationale that Quicken, when in the hands of
Microsoft, would present anticompetitive dangers that were absent
165. REBACK ET AL, supra note 115, pt. Ill(B).
166. Id., pl. III(B)(4).
167. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Agreements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 19-20 (1957).
168. See SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (3d. ed. 1957) (describing how
words carry over connotations from one context into another).
169. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
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when Quicken was in the hands of Intuit. The difference seems to lie
in Microsoft's ability to use Quicken's larger installed base as an asset
for exploiting synergies with Microsoft's other capabilities. For rea-
sons already stated, the combination of technologies to create new
value is behavior which the antitrust laws, properly understood, are
designed to encourage. It is the opposite of a restriction of output, the
kind of behavior that the antitrust laws were meant to condemn. A
telling inquiry is whether the Justice Department would (or could)
find grounds for condemning Microsoft's combining its own Money
program with other technological capabilities which Microsoft has
been developing. After the failure of the Intuit merger, Microsoft will
be compelled to use its original Money software as a route into the
provision of banking services. Yet, so far at least, the Justice Depart-
ment is not objecting to Microsoft's continued development of Money
or expansion of Money into on-line banking. But why not? What is
the difference between Microsoft's expansion of Money's capabilities
with banking and other Microsoft capabilities and Microsoft's doing
the same thing with Quicken? It is not a satisfactory answer to assert
that Quicken differs from Money because Quicken commands a larger
market share. That answer is not satisfactory, because it implies that
were Money to replace Quicken as the market leader, Microsoft
would be legally forbidden to combine banking and other services
with Money. Yet there is no apparent basis for forbidding Microsoft
from combining other technical capabilities which it possesses with
Money, and the Justice Department has not even hinted that it would
find such behavior problematic.
If the Department's position is accurately described above, then
the Department is, in effect, imposing a development "path" on
Microsoft, analogous to the "critical path" discussed above, except
here the path is constraining. Microsoft is free to develop Money. It
is free to employ Money as its tool for entry into on-line banking serv-
ices. Should Money become the market leader in financial planning,
then Money's large installed base would make Microsoft's entry into
on-line banking much easier. But Microsoft is not free to jump-start
its entry into on-line banking by purchasing (or otherwise acquiring)
another firm which is the financial planning market leader. Restated
in old-fashioned antitrust language, Microsoft is free to pursue its ex-
pansion plans through "internal expansion," but not through "acquisi-
tion." When the internal-expansion/acquisition dichotomy was part of
antitrust discourse, it reflected an archaic understanding of the law.
That dichotomy reflected the view that § 7 of the Clayton Act was
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directed, by its terms, at acquisitions. Internal expansion, however an-
ticompetitive the result, was not covered by the Clayton Act. When
the profession concluded that internal expansion cannot produce an-
ticompetitive results, the dichotomy lost its meaning. Then it became
apparent (or should have become apparent) that an acquisition which
does not reduce competition between market participants and which
produces results equivalent to internal expansion cannot be anticom-
petitive either.
Yet the Department is providing us with a new doctrine which
alters antitrust analysis. It is the doctrine of the internal expansion
"path." Some firms which show potential for combining technologies
will be required to proceed down a path whose boundaries are set by
the expansion of their own in-house technologies. They will not be
permitted to shift to a different "path" by purchasing assets or tech-
nologies for synergistic use with their in-house technologies. The
firms which are so confined to this officially-imposed internal-expan-
sion critical path are those which present the prospect of dominating
the market as a result of the attractiveness of the product package
which they offer consumers. This new rule of law has antecedents in
the antitrust law of the 1960s. It is related to the view that antitrust
law is more tolerant of results achieved through internal expansion, a
view largely grounded on the structure of the Clayton Act. It is also
related to the doctrine of entrenchment, a doctrine which flourished
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.17 °
VIII. MICROSOFT ON-LINE SERVICES AND WINDOWS 95
When Windows 95 was introduced, it came with an icon promot-
ing Microsoft's then new on-line service, Microsoft Network. For
some time, computers have been marketed to the public with icons
promoting other on-line networks, such as Prodigy, CompuServ, and
America Online. The inclusion of an icon promoting the Microsoft
Network on Windows 95, however, was a matter of concern to the
Justice Department. The Justice Department apparently thought that
Microsoft might be competing unfairly with its rivals in a way which
would violate the antitrust laws.
It is not entirely clear, however, how Microsoft's inclusion of the
icon inviting computer users to subscribe to the Microsoft Network
would (or might) violate the antitrust laws. One is tempted to think in
terms of tying: Purchasers of Windows 95 necessarily purchase both
170. See supra part VII.B.
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Windows 95, which they want, and the icon, which they may or may
not want. Yet the tying analogy ultimately fails. It is not the icon in
itself that the Department (and Microsoft's on-line competitors) are
disturbed about; rather it is the icon as an instrument guiding com-
puter users to the Microsoft Network. Since subscriptions to the
Microsoft Network do not come with the icon and must be separately
purchased, the arrangement is just not a tying arrangement.
Perhaps the Justice Department had in mind a § 2 offense: By
including the icon, Microsoft might be monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize the market for on-line services. The Department was
probably thinking along the lines suggested by language in United
States v. Griffith, 7' condemning a monopolist who uses its monopoly
in one market to gain a competitive advantage over rivals in another
market.172 There are, however, substantial problems in applying this
language to Microsoft's inclusion of its icon in Windows 95 because
Windows 95 was a new product which had no market share at all at
the time of its introduction. But even if Windows 95 does not com-
mand a monopoly market share, Microsoft as an entity does command
a market share of operating systems (through its MS-DOS, Windows
NT, and Windows 95 releases) sufficient to be characterized as a mo-
nopoly for antitrust purposes. Similarly Microsoft controls a monop-
oly share of graphic user interfaces (through Windows 3.1, Windows
NT, Windows 95, and other Windows releases). Thus, maybe
Microsoft was "leveraging" (in an antitrust sense) its monopoly over
operating systems to gain a competitive advantage over its
competitors.
An inquiry into how Microsoft may have been "using" its monop-
oly to gain a competitive advantage over its on-line rivals is required.
Microsoft may have been using the attractiveness of its Windows 95
release to ensure that computer users had access to the promotional
icon, and presenting the icon to computer users was advantageous to
Microsoft. But Microsoft might reply that it was not "using" its mo-
nopoly over operating systems to obtain this advantage. In this analy-
sis, Microsoft's monopoly over operating systems resulted from its
control over MS-DOS, Windows NT, and Windows 95, but it was "us-
ing" only Windows 95 to obtain this advantage. (A similar analysis
applies to Microsoft's monopoly share of graphic user interfaces).
This response, however, will not withstand a critique identifying the
proper relevant market. The relevant market for purposes of analyz-
171. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
172. Id. at 107.
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ing this claim is the market in which operating systems are presently
being sold. Probably most operating systems (for IBM-compatible
computers) which have been sold since August 1995 are Windows 95.
In that analysis, Microsoft is "using" its monopoly over operating sys-
tems presently being sold, i.e., its monopoly over operating system
sales since August 1995 which is primarily composed of sales of Win-
dows 95.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has rejected the view that the use of
a monopoly to gain a competitive advantage constitutes monopoliza-
tion.173 In Alaska Airlines, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected that
view, 174 which it equates with the Second Circuit's decision in Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.175 In the Ninth Circuit's view, the
use of monopoly power to monopolize another market constitutes
monopolization. 176 However, § 2 is not violated by anything less than
monopolizing a market or attempting to monopolize a market.177 In
the view of the Ninth Circuit, the language in United States v. Grif-
fith178 has been effectively rejected by the Court's embrace of effi-
ciency as the ultimate criterion for antitrust law interpretation. 179 The
Third Circuit'80 has followed the Ninth Circuit's revisionist approach
to Griffith.18 1 Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,12 rejecting shortcuts to the proof of at-
tempted monopolization, lends support to the Ninth Circuit's
position. 183
Thus, although the Department may have a "monopoly leverag-
ing" theory derived from Griffith by which to challenge Microsoft's
inclusion of the icon in its Windows 95 release, that theory is currently
subject to reevaluation. It is doubtful whether that theory would sur-
vive Supreme Court review, especially in the light of Spectrum Sports.
173. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 977 (1992).
174. Id. at 547.
175. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
176. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547-48.
177. Id. at 548.
178. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
179. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547.
180. Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 921 (1993).
181. Id. at 206.
182. 506 U.S. 447 (1993); see Daniel J. Gifford, Predatory Pricing Analysis in the Supreme
Court, 39 ANTrrRuST BULL. 431, 474-77 (1994) (discussing the decision of Spectrum Sports).
183. See Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging,
40 ANTTRUST BULL. 371, 378-88 (1995) (discussing caselaw developments on "monopoly
leveraging").
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But there is another aspect of the monopoly leveraging theory which
renders it even more suspect than the current reevaluation of that the-
ory by the circuit courts. What kind of an "advantage" did Microsoft
gain over its rivals by including the icon in its Windows 95 release?
Does this "advantage" rise to the level of the "advantage" of which
Griffith speaks?
As noted above, all three of the leading on-line services (Prodigy,
CompuServ, and America Online) promote their services with icons
embedded in new computer operating systems. The imbedded icons
provide the on-line services with an "advantage." In addition to the
proprietary on-line services market, many companies provide internet
access and the Prodigy, CompuServ, and America Online icons argua-
bly provide these leading companies competitive advantages in the In-
ternet-access market over their smaller rivals. So the "advantage"
which Microsoft has over its rivals consists in behavior which is widely
replicated by the very rivals which are being disadvantaged. More-
over, these same "disadvantaged" rivals are exploiting analogous ad-
vantages over their own smaller rivals in the internet-access market.
All of this makes it doubtful that the Microsoft "advantage" derived
from the icon is sufficiently critical or unique as to fall under the Grif-
fith condemnation. Further, it is questionable whether Griffith meant
to condemn an "advantage" to a new entrant which would offer in-
creased competition to established rivals constituting a practical oli-
gopoly of three companies.
To properly assess the antitrust significance of Microsoft's behav-
ior, we need to ask what that behavior accomplishes. Adding the icon
to the Windows 95 release is a cost-effective way of providing the icon
to a large public. Since the icon is a promotional device, we can con-
clude that adding the icon to the Windows 95 release is a cost-effective
way of placing promotional devices in the hands of potential purchas-
ers. Stated in those terms, Microsoft is engaged in nothing more than
aggressive marketing for its products. On what theory would the anti-
trust laws require Microsoft to employ higher-cost alternatives to pro-
mote its new on-line product? Such a theory might be one based upon
fairness to Microsoft's rivals: They have to pay for the privilege of
including an icon on the graphic user interfaces of newly marketed
personal computers, whereas Microsoft places its icon on those inter-
faces without having to pay for it. Surely this is an advantage to
Microsoft, and it may appear unfair. But it does not restrict output. It
also provides an information service to consumers about the availabil-
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ity of the Microsoft service. In an efficiency analysis, the inclusion of
the icon does not appear objectionable.
IX. CONCLUSION
Recent events surrounding Microsoft Corporation help to expose
some of the current antitrust approaches of the Justice Department.
The Department's concern with the lump-sum licensing arrangement
and with the promotional icon reveal the Department's continuing
concern that vertical relationships may engender horizontally restric-
tive effects. Thus, the Department was concerned that Microsoft's
lump-sum license imposed hardships on its rivals, thereby inhibiting
competition in the operating systems market. While the Department's
approach is subject to minor criticisms, its formulation of a decree
which allows significant monitoring efficiencies is praiseworthy.
Moreover, the Department showed immensely more sophistication
than Judge Sporkin over the "normative" implications of the decree.
Although not discussed above, the Department merits further praise
for not attempting to restructure the software industry, an attempt
which could only yield disastrous results.'84 All-in-all, the consent de-
cree evidences a unique combination of responsible enforcement with
an awareness of the dangers of overenforcement.
However, nothing good can be said about the Department's han-
dling of the Intuit merger. Here it appears the Department was react-
ing to political pressures engendered by banks and rival applications
providers. The Department seems to have embraced, perhaps tempo-
rarily, an archaic view of merger law (perhaps having performed inad-
equate analytical work before it acted). At least the Department's
theoretical framework for its action against the Intuit merger is not
fully articulated.
Finally, the Department's concern over the inclusion of the pro-
motional icon in the Windows 95 release is ultimately ambiguous.
There is ground, expressed above, for believing that the Department's
concern is misplaced. Yet the fact that the Department has not chal-
lenged this behavior is a sign that the Department may have come to
the conclusion that the icon is ultimately innocuous and that its con-
184. See generally Lopatka & Page, supra note 91 (discussing some of the difficulties of re-
structuring the operating systems market). Among other considerations, they point out that
there is no way of knowing whether consumers would be better off in a natural monopoly mar-
ket by substituting one monopolist for another. Id. at 354. In any event, such a market restruc-
turing is beyond the competence of the courts. The losses to society which would be incurred in
any such attempt would be immense.
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cern of last summer may have been unduly influenced by Microsoft's
on-line rivals.
